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ABSTRACT 
The paper discusses the consequences of the adoption of a new pension system that 
considers the number of children born in Austria. Combining a demographic family 
model with a pension model and cost profiles of social security expenditures, a policy 
simulation tool is obtained which allows the testing of different social security policies. 
The feasibility of the suggested pension reform is examined on both the system level and 
the individual level to determine under which circumstances such a policy is reasonable 
and affordable. 
The first conclusion is that the new pension system would be cost neutral. Secondly, 
provided a certain response to the pronatalist character of the new system in the form 
of an increase in fertility, the performance of the social security system would improve. 
Thirdly, the new system would significantly change the income distribution of retired 
women to the extent that single and divorced women with children are no longer 
discriminated. Thus, the emancipatory goal of the policy is fulfilled. 
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EVALUATING A PENSION SYSTEM CONSIDERING CHILDREN BORN: 
THE CASE OF AUSTRIA 
Christopher Prinz 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Fertility and social security issues are frequently dealt with simultaneously, as several 
links between low fertility and the existence of social security and particularly pension 
provisions exist. In societies which lack collective systems to provide for retirement, 
people are dependent on their offspring for old age security. In such societies, old age 
security is recognized as one of the motives for having children (Joshi, 1991). As a 
consequence, pension provision has been suggested as a policy to reduce birth rates in 
poor, high fertility countries. 
Pension provision has also been pointed at as an explanation of low fertility in rich 
countries. As Paul Demeny (1987) stated: "The emergence of national social security 
schemes that made old age support a collective social responsibility completed this 
process [of weakening the motives for having children.] by severing the link between 
persons' economic status in old age and their fertility behavior in the earlier stages of 
adulthood". 
Falling fertility rates cause a problem for the financing of old age security, since 
large generations of the retired expect transfers from a smaller generation of workers. 
This is particularly true for Pay-As-You-Go social security systems which characterize 
Austria and most industrial countries. Each generation of workers contributes collectively 
to the pensions of their predecessors, hence current and expected changes in the age 
structure will put a strain on this inter-generational contract. One way to resolve the 
difficulty would be to maintain fertility at replacement levels. It was suggested that the 
new direction for pronatalist policies "should be a search for institutional innovation that 
would re-establish the positive material link between fertility behavior and old age 
security" (Demeny, 1987). 
Rather than transferring part of individual social security contributions directly to 
living parents as suggested by Demeny, the pension reform presented in this study 
increases entitlements for retired women according to their parity. Additional benefits 
do not depend on the professional activity and income of a woman's own children but 
only on the number of children she has raised. The pension policy should have several 
effects: First, the policy aims at re-establishing the positive link between childrearing and 
pension entitlement. Women with children should no longer be discriminated with 
respect to their income during the period of retirement (emancipatory goal). Second, the 
policy aims at increasing fertility to avoid both excessive population aging and excessive 
population decline. Women should be encouraged to give birth to additional children 
by offering them certain pension benefits in dependence on the number of children 
(pronatalist goal). Third, the new pension system should not significantly worsen the 
performance of the social security system in general, even if there is no response to the 
implementation of the system in the form of an increase in birth rates (performance 
neutrality). 
The feasibility of the suggested pension reform has to be tested on both the system 
level and the individual level. A costlbenefit analysis on the social security level 
demonstrates under which circumstances the policy is affordable. A costlbenefit analysis 
on the individual level shows whether the policy is reasonable. 
2. DEMOGRAPHIC MODEL AND DATA 
A projection of the female population by family type is needed from the 
demographic side to calculate costs and benefits of the pension policy suggested. In the 
projection model, family type is characterized by the dimensions age, marital status and 
number of children ever born. 
The projection model fulfills the minimum requirement for a family model, that is 
connecting adults and children, and it is of the dynamic multistate-type. The model 
allows simultaneous analysis of family formation processes for both dimensions, marital 
status and number of children ever born. It is based on the concept of the "family related 
life cycle of individuals" which is an extension of the "family cycle concept". The latter 
assumes a standard sequence of events given a nuclear family (i.e. first marriage, birth 
of the first child, ..., birth of the last child, ..., death of the spouse), neither allowing for 
different sequences, e.g. first marriage only after the birth of the first child, nor for 
different events, like divorce or remarriage. The family related life cycle concept, which 
is still based on legal marital status, however, is flexible both with respect to possible 
events and to their sequence. 
The increase of new living arrangements, like non-marital consensual unions, has 
introduced new limitations to the concept of the life cycle. Considering marital status 
only, it is for example not possible to distinguish between an unmarried two-parent family 
and a family consisting of a single mother and her child(ren). The extent of the bias 
connected with the choice of using marital status depends on the particular country under 
consideration and on the extent marital status is a good predictor of the relevant behavior 
of the individuals considered. For the following analysis it seems appropriate to rely on 
legal marital status statistics. In Austria, marital status still is a reasonable proxy for 
living arrangements of individuals aged 25 and over. The Austrian pension system now 
as before uses information on marital status and not on actual living arrangements. 
The model is a one-sex model, which is typical for most of the family models in 
operation. It is hierarchical with respect to the parity dimension and of increment- 
decrement type in the marital status dimension. It distinguishes 12 life cycle stages of a 
woman, namely 
single, no child 
single, one or more children 
married, no child 
married, one child 
married, two children 
married, three or more children 
widowed, no child 
widowed, one child 
widowed, two or more children 
divorced, no child 
divorced, one child 
divorced, two or more children. 
It is assumed that births of parity 4+ among married women, parity 3+ among 
widowed and divorced women, and parity 2+ among single women do not cause a change 
in the life cycle. Changes in the life cycle result from birth of a child (depending on 
parity), first marriage, divorce, remarriage, and widowhood caused by the death of the 
husband. Removal or death of a child does not affect the mother's life cycle, since both 
the model and the pension policy investigated are based on the number of children ever 
born. Demographic events that affect the life cycle are assumed to occur independently. 
Possible events included in the model are given in Table 1. 
Entry into and exit from the state space, namely birth of a girl and death of a 
woman, both depend on a woman's age and marital status, but are -- due to a lack of 
available data -- independent of the number of children already born. Marriage, divorce, 
and remarriage depend on age and the number of children born; widowhood only 
depends on a woman's age. 
The model belongs to the family of multidimensional population projection models 
which are based on the Markovian assumption. That is, the model supposes that future 
behavior only depends on current status, and not on the path via which this status was 
reached. For some of the variables considered, this assumption may be too crude an 
approximation of reality, since for example divorce rates increase with marriage order. 
However, to incorporate such dependencies would greatly complicate the model. A 
detailed mathematical description of multistate projection models is for example given 
in Willekens and Drewe (1984). 
Status-specific fertility and mortality rates were taken from the database of the 
Austrian Statistical Office. Occurrence/exposure rates between life cycle stages have for 
the most part been made available from a recent study undertaken by the Demographic 
Institute of the Austrian Academy of Sciences (Aufhauser and Lutz, 1987). They used 
a similar model to analyze the family related life cycle of Austrian women from a purely 
demographic point of view. They estimated occurrence/exposure rates using the Austrian 
1986 microcensus, where women aged 16-59 were asked about their complete marriage 
and birth biography. The respective population at risk and the absolute number of 
events, i.e. changes between statuses, were estimated on a monthly basis for the years 
1981-1986 to calculate monthly rates. To eliminate random fluctuations, average monthly 
rates for the period 1981-1986 were calculated and converted into annual 
occurrence/exposure rates. 
Table 1. Possible events considered in the family model. 
Life cycle 
status before 
event: 
single, 0 
single, 1 + 
married, 0 
married, 1 
married, 2 
married, 3 + 
widowed, 0 
widowed, 1 
widowed, 2 + 
divorced, 0 
divorced, 1 
divorced, 2 + 
Life cycle status after event: 
- B M *  * * * a * * * * 
* * * 
- * M M M *  * * * 
* * * * 
- B  * W *  * D *  
* * * 
- B  * * W *  * D *  
* * * * B *  * W *  * D  
* * * * * * 
- * W *  * D  
* * M *  * * - B * * * * 
* * * M *  * * - B  * * * 
* * * * M M *  * * * * - 
* * M *  * * * * * B  * 
* * * M *  * * * * * 
- B  
* * * * * * * * M M *  
events: 'B' ... childbearing, 
'M' ... marriage or remarriage, 
'D' ... divorce, 
'W' ... widowhood, 
,*, ... impossible event, and 
'-' 
... no event. 
With these 12 statuses, the number of possible transitions is 28: 12 for marriages 
(first marriage or remarriage), 4 for divorce, 4 for widowhood and 8 through birth of a 
child. Another 12 transitions result from the exit from the state space (death). All 
newborn enter the population via the status singlelparity 0. 
Given the model and the data, projections of the number of women by age, marital 
status and number of children born were prepared using the DIALOG Personal 
Computer software, a general multidimensional population projection model, developed 
by Sergei Scherbov (Scherbov and Grechucha, 1988). Their projection model is a mixture 
of the linear and the exponential type, while occurrence/exposure rates estimate the 
parameters of an exponential model. The resulting bias, however, is not of significance 
for the purpose of testing policy reforms. Starting with the 1985 female population of 
Austria by age, marital status and number of children born, the future population 
distribution is obtained by applying the estimated transition intensities, taking into 
account observed status-specific fertility and mortality rates. 
3. POLICY SIMULATION TOOL 
Combining the demographic family model with a pension model and cost profiles 
of social security expenditures, a policy simulation tool is obtained which allows tests of 
different social security policies. The simulation tool can be used not only to look at the 
performance of the social security system but also at policy consequences for individuals. 
3.1. Pension Model 
The pension projection model is the one used in the comparative study of which 
results are presented in Gomot (1992). Benefits received by an individual are calculated 
as the product of the yearly benefit rate multiplied by the number of years insured 
multiplied by past gross salary. Since no information on salary by family status is 
available and the yearly benefit rate is constant, only the number of years insured differs 
by family status. As in the model in Gomot (1992), number of years insured are 
assumed to equal the number of years worked and are thus estimated from observed 
labor force participation rates along cohort lines. Labor force participation rates of 
Austrian females are available both by marital status and by number of children born, 
but cross-classifications by marital status and number of children, i.e. by family status, had 
to be estimated. Labor force participation rates are kept constant at their 1985 level. 
Observed recent increases in female labor force participation rates result in an increase 
in the number of years worked of around 3-5 years by 2015. The estimation procedure 
resulted in family status-specific average number of years worked at mean age at 
retirement as shown in Table 2. 
The average number of years worked is highest among divorced and lowest among 
married women, and strongly declines with the number of children born. For example, 
married women retiring in 1985 with parity 0 have on average worked 29.6 years, and 
women of parities 1, 2 and 3+ worked around 5, 10 and 12 years less, respectively. 
These figures observed in 1985 influenced the decision on how to introduce a pension 
scheme considering children born. In a recent Norwegian study, it was estimated that a 
woman born in 1950 who has had two children, the first at age 21-22 and the second a 
couple of years afterwards, worked 6.8 years less up to the age of 37 than a childless 
woman (Kravdal, 1991). In a recent British analysis it was estimated that the time 
diverted from market work by a two-child mother was 9.1 years up to age 60 (Joshi, 
1990). 
Other variables needed to calculate total pension benefits are kept constant at their 
1985 level: the proportion of the population retired at each age (90% of the female 
population aged 55 and over), the mean age at retirement (58.9 years) and average gross 
salary of women (141,192 Austrian Schillings per year). 
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Table 2. Average number of years worked by family status, 1985 and 2015. 
3.2. A Pension Scheme Considering Children Born 
Family status 
single, parity 0 
single, parity 1 + 
married, parity 0 
married, parity 1 
married, parity 2 
married, parity 3 + 
widowed, parity 0 
widowed, parity 1 
widowed, parity 2 
widowed, parity 3 + 
divorced, parity 0 
divorced, parity 1 
divorced, parity 2 
divorced, parity 3 + 
The idea of introducing a pension scheme considering children born is based on 
several facts and also expectations. Continued fertility below replacement level 
significantly reduces the size of the population and thereby the labor force and most 
likely a country's economic competitiveness. Pay-As-You-Go pension systems are only 
sustainable on the basis of an increasing or at least constant cohort size. Fertility around 
replacement level is in the long run a precondition to avoid both excessive population 
aging and excessive population decline, which relates to the concepts "quality of life" and 
"continuity of life", respectively. Today's level of fertility in Austria is around 1.4-1.5 
children per woman thus reproducing only around 70 percent of a generation. With no 
change in fertility, Austria's population would decline from around 7.5 million in 1985 to 
around 5 million in 2050. In order to avoid excessive immigration only an increase in 
fertility would keep Austria's population sustainable in terms of population and cohort 
size. Introducing a pronatalist policy may be one possibility to increase fertility, although 
hardly any signs indicating a shift from increased individualism and desire for 
independence back to familism or rather towards a new and modern form of familism can 
be observed. One reason for the low number of births is the bad financial situation of 
families and more so of one-parent families, which still to 90 percent consist of women 
1985 
30.6 
24.9 
29.6 
24.1 
19.0 
17.6 
30.5 
24.8 
19.5 
18.0 
36.0 
29.3 
23.0 
21.3 
2015 
34.7 
28.3 
34.3 
27.9 
22.0 
20.3 
35.3 
28.7 
22.6 
20.9 
40.9 
33.3 
26.2 
24.2 
and their children. Parents are materially disadvantaged compared to individuals or 
couples who have no dependent children. Childrearing costs have increased to an extent 
which in no way reflects the essential contribution that the existence of a child makes to 
the future of a nation. Not only are (mainly) women and especially divorced women with 
children discriminated during the time of childrearing, but also during their retirement. 
Consequently, the notion of a pronatalist policy has to be expanded to an emancipatory 
policy as well. 
The suggested pension policy includes a provision of five years counting as years of 
insurance per child born -- up to 3 children -- i.e. 5 years for one child, 10 years for two 
children and maximally 15 years for three or more children, to compensate for the 
interruption of work during active life. It is not possible to compensate a woman's loss 
of career opportunities. Compensation of direct childrearing costs by increasing child 
allowances is not considered in this paper since the aim was to test a pronatalist pension 
policy and not a pronatalist policy in general. Having children is interpreted as part of 
consumption and whether increasing family allowances may be beneficial to the state as 
well is beyond the scope of this paper. 
This policy that considers children born is easy to implement both in the pension 
model in hand and in reality. A problem may arise in the case of women who do not 
take care of their children, e.g. after a divorce. It is assumed that those women do not 
lose their pension rights. In the model, years worked are set equal to years of insurance, 
thus the respective status-specific number of years worked (see Table 2) is increased by I 
5, 10 or 15 years for women with children. The additional number of years provided are 
seen to be sufficient to devote enough time to children present in the family when they 
are in urgent need of their parents. Whether providing five years per child is sufficient 
to make up for the pension disadvantage of mothers during their period of retirement is 
tested in the model. Only women are considered, since still most fathers' economic 
activity is not affected by the birth of a child. What is not considered in the model is a 
possible reaction to the new policy that consists in a reduction in female labor force 
participation rates. Although such a reaction sounds realistic, in fact it is not since 
women's economic activity has clearly increased during recent decades and is generally 
expected to increase even further. In the model, constant activity levels are assumed 
which reflects the author's belief that activity rates, even with the new policy introduced, 
will increase rather than decline. 
The pension policy to be implemented will have a second characteristic, namely a 
gradual cancellation of the provision of survivor benefits. Survivor benefits, also called 
widowhood pension, in Austria, mainly ensure a minimum income for elderly woman, and 
they make up around 35 percent of the total pension expenditures paid to women in 
1985. Survivor benefits provided by the current system equal 60 percent of the husband's 
former pension and are paid out independent of the woman's old age pension. Within 
the framework of an emancipatory pension policy it seems reasonable to partly or even 
completely cancel survivor pensions, depending on how many additional years per child 
counting for the pension are provided. In this model, a complete cancellation of survivor 
benefits is assumed in the long run. Whether savings to the state due to the cancellation 
of survivor benefits are sufficient to compensate additional old age benefits provided by 
the new pension scheme is one of the major questions to be tested in the model. 
For the introduction of the pension policy a period of smooth transition is assumed. 
The new system is implemented for birth cohorts 1946 and thereafter only, i.e. for women 
below age 40 in 1985. During the coming two decades the old pension system is still in 
operation. From 2005 on, new retirees receive their benefits according to the new rules. 
From this time on, two parallel systems are in operation until the new system reaches 
maturity (around 2030). This smooth transition period was taken for both old age and 
survivor pension benefits, thus increasingly canceling provisions of survivor benefits until 
the year 2030. 
The pension policy considered involves two scenarios concerning future fertility: 
a) A "benchmark scenario" assuming the marital status-specific fertility levels will 
remain constant at their 1985 level. 
b) A "fertility scenario" assuming an increase in fertility corresponding to half a child 
per woman or 0.5 in the total fertility rate, resulting in almost two children per 
woman on average. 
Both scenarios assume mortality, (re)marriage, divorce and widowhood rates to remain 
constant at their 1985 level. Occurrence/exposure rates between family statuses that are 
related to fertility, e.g. the jump from marriedlparity 1 to marriedlparity 2, are changed 
proportionally to the change in fertility. The increase in fertility which is assumed in the 
fertility scenario is based on the assumption of an immediate response to the new pension 
policy introduced. While it is not possible to foresee whether women respond to the new 
pension policy by giving birth to additional children, it is possible to calculate costs and 
benefits of the different pension policies based on certain population developments and 
reactions. 
For the social security system mainly the cost neutrality of the new pension system 
matters. Other macroeconomic consequences of both the policy itself and a possible 
fertility increase, like additional education expenditures or shifts in consumption and 
savings, are not considered. 
3.3. Cost Profiles of Social Security Expenditures 
To calculate total and per capita pension benefits both with the current system and 
with the new regulation, and to calculate how many benefits an individual would gain per 
additional child in this new regulation and how much this would possibly cost the system 
is only one side of the problem. Both for the system and for individuals other 
calculations have to be added. 
In the case of an immediate and full response to the pension policy, meaning that 
women decide to give birth to additional children, from the point of view of the 
performance of the social security system some calculations have to be added (see Table 
3). An increase in the number of children and hence in total population would also 
increase expenses of other social security programs: health expenditures (mainly benefits 
in kind), work injury and unemployment benefits (only cash benefits), and family benefits 
including both family allowances and maternity benefits (also cash benefits). Other social 
expenditures like education expenditures are not considered. 
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Table 3. Social security revenues and expenditures included in the model. 
Revenues and expenditures with the current social security system 
+ additional old age pension benefits due to the 
- survivor pension benefits 
1 + additional health expenditures I system, i.e. 
new system 
+ contributions losses due to lower economic activity of women 
- additional contributions of children (i.e additional labor force) 
I 
+ additional family allowances and maternity benefits 
due to a 
response to 
the new 
I an increase in fertility 
+ additional work injury and unemployment benefits I 
Additional social security costs may -- at least in the long run -- be covered by 
additional contributions paid by an increased labor force. For the calculation of 
contributions, the contribution rate for social security is kept constant at the 1985 level 
which was 43.7 percent of gross salary liable to contributions, 15.6% and 28.1% for 
employees and employers, respectively. On the other hand, additional children would 
also lessen the average number of years a woman works and thus reduce social security 
contributions somewhat. 
Apart from pension expenditures, social security costs are estimated using age-cost- 
profiles of social security expenditures. Observed age-cost-profiles for Austria in 1986 
are taken from Find1 et al. (1987) and kept constant throughout the projection period. 
According to their estimates, Austria's total social security expenditure in 1986 was 
around 335 billion Austrian Schillings (ATS) or 29.5% of GNP, of which 60% was paid 
for pensions. A further 22% was used on health expenditure, 11% on family benefits and 
7% on work injury and unemployment benefits. Social security expenditures depend not 
only on the age structure but also on the marital status structure of the population. 
Hence, in a model age-marital status-cost-profiles should be preferred. But as 
information on the marital status structure of social security costs is lacking, only age- 
profiles have been used. Observed age-cost-profiles of social security expenditures for 
the three social security programs are given in Figure 1. Health expenditures increase 
with age, while family benefits mainly apply to the youngest age groups. Unemployment 
is more frequent at ages 20-30 and ages 50-60, work injury mainly concerns people aged 
50 and over. 
30 
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Figure 1. Age-profiles of social security costs, 1986. 
3.4. Childrearing Costs and Savings-'Qpe Pension Scheme 
On the individual side, the aim of the pension policy is to remove disadvantages 
during retirement, but not during active life. The model considers savings losses that are 
caused by direct childrearing costs. It is assumed that a women uses a certain percentage 
of her income, in the general model set equal to 10% of gross salary, to realize a private 
savings-type pension scheme. Childrearing costs lower the income of which 10% is 
accumulated. The saving-type pension scheme can thus be seen as an alternative to the 
emancipatory and pronatalist pension rule to be implemented. A woman with children 
can benefit from the new public pension scheme but less money will go to the private 
savings-type pension scheme. 
Based on data on childrearing costs by household expenditure and number of 
children published in Miinz (1984), childrearing costs by number of childrenpresent in 
the family have been estimated for 1985 as shown in Table 4. Data give childrearing 
costs including proportional housing costs after subtraction of family allowances. 
Table 4. Childrearing costs by number of children present in the family (in ATS). 
Childrearing costs 
per month 
during life 
per child 
1 child 2 children 3 children 
5230 5970 6950 
1,254,000 1,566,000 1,923,000 
1,254,000 783,000 64 1,000 
Given the costs per month by number of children present in the family, i.e. data in 
the first row, lifetime costs are estimated on the basis of a specific family formation 
schedule. Assumptions concerning this schedule include: age 25 at first birth, a 2.5 year 
birth interval, 20 years childrearing per child and not more than 3 children per woman. 
Consequently, a mother of one child spends 20 years with her child, a mother of two 
children spends 5 years with one child and 17.5 years with two children, and a mother of 
three children spends 5 years with one child, 5 years with two children and 15 years with 
three children thus spending 25 years with children. 
Data in Table 4 show that additional costs resulting from a second and/or third 
child are to a large extent covered by family allowances, although it looks as if a third 
child more often leads to a change in housing, because the difference between two and 
three children is larger than the difference between one child and two children. During 
a woman's life the costs for one child equal 1,254 million Austrian Schillings or 9 times 
the average yearly gross salary. Costs for two and three children are, respectively, 25 and 
53 percent higher than costs for only one child. 
Lifetime childrearing costs by number of children (Table 4) can also be compared 
to a woman's average lifetime salary. Costs for one child correspond to 36% of the 
lifetime salary of a woman of parity 1, costs for two and three children amount to 56% 
and 76% of lifetime salary of a woman of parity 2 and 3, respectively. When comparing 
per child costs in one, two and three children families, each child in a three children 
family is half as costly as a single. 
Now, to the lower pensions: Savings losses due to childrearing are calculated out 
of lifetime childrearing costs. As women bear their children in their twenties (between 
age 25 and 30 in our model), for those women who do not have children there is much 
time to accumulate saved money until retirement. For that purpose an actuarial 
calculation is added, assuming real rates of interest equal to O%, 1.5% and 3%. 
A second factor reducing a mother's pension is the lower economic activity that is 
due to the interruption of work during the upbringing of children. Again, lower economic 
activity results in lower income of which 10% is accumulated in the saving-type pension 
scheme. This fact is also taken into consideration in the actuarial calculation. 
Consequently, from an individual point of view, the relevant calculations oppose pension 
benefit gains that are due to the new pension scheme, and savings losses that are due to 
childrearing and could alternatively be invested in a private savings-type pension scheme. 
One more variable had to be set constant, namely the life expectancy at mean age 
at retirement, which was 23 years in 1985. This variable is needed to distribute total 
savings losses due to both childrearing costs and lower economic activity over the period 
of retirement. While pension benefit gains are calculated on a yearly basis, savings losses 
are calculated on a lifetime basis and hence have to be distributed over years of 
retirement to make gains and losses comparable. On average, this distribution procedure 
is correct; on an individual level, however, a woman who survives more than 23 years 
after retirement gains more than the average woman. 
4. FEMALE POPULATION STRUCTURE 
The marital status structure of the adult female population by parity is shown in 
Table 5. Half of the population aged 15 and over is married with at least one child, and 
one-fifth is single without children (mainly young women). Every sixth woman is 
widowed (mainly old women), most of them have two or more children, and only 5 
percent are divorced. 
Table 5. Women aged 15 years and over by family status, 1985 (in %). 
11 parity 1 1 3.5 13.2 3.0 11 
Status 
Parity 0 
11 Parity 2 I - 18.9 5.1 11 
single married widowed divorced 
19.7 5.2 1.7 0.7 
Age-specific transition rates are shown in Figures 2a-d. Fertility rates are by far 
highest among married women. In many cases marriage still is a prerequisite for a birth. 
Note that widowed women have higher birth rates than divorced and single women (see 
Figure 2a). For example, the average number of children born by a married woman 
during her main childbearing ages (ages 20 to 35) is 1.03. The corresponding figures are 
0.47, 0.33 and 0.23, for widowed, divorced and single women, respectively. 
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Figure 2a. Fertility rates by marital status. Figure 2b. First marriage rates by parity. 
Marriage rates are highest among single women of parity 1, a first birth often being 
the reason for a first marriage (see Figure 2b). For women with two or more children, 
first marriage rates are significantly lower than without children. Remarriage rates of 
divorcees among women with parity 3+ are by far lower than among parities 0-2 (see 
Figure 2c). Both first and remarriage rates peak at age 20-24 and decline rapidly with 
age, the exception being remamage rates among childless women which indicate a second 
peak at age 40-44. Divorce rates clearly decrease with parity, independently of a 
woman's age (see Figure 2d). Divorce rates also indicate a first peak at age 20-24 and, 
except for childless women, a second peak at around age 40. 
Similar to fertility, mortality rates are lowest for married women, but they differ 
insignificantly for the other marital statuses. The results of the demographic family 
model are already interesting by themselves. Both the structure by marital status and by 
number of children ever born will change significantly. Changes in the marital 
composition have been documented in Gonnot (1992). Table 6 contains results 
concerning the number of children born per woman only. Since the aim of this policy 
simulation is also of a pronatalist nature, resulting changes in the population structure 
are especially interesting with respect to changes in fertility. 
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Table 6. Women aged 15 years and over by parity, 1985-2050 (percentage). 
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Figure 2c. Remamage rates by parity. Figure 2d. Divorce rates by parity. 
Scenario Parity 
Benchmark no child 
Scenario 
one child 
two children 
three children 
Fertility no child 
Scenario 
one child 
two children 
three children 
1985 2000 2015 2030 2050 
27 27 28 29 3 1 
22 23 24 26 27 
26 28 29 29 28 
25 22 18 15 14 
25 27 27 28 
23 23 24 24 
29 30 3 1 30 
24 2 1 19 18 
In 1985, an almost equivalent share of women falls in the categories parity 0, 1, 2 
and 3+ (see Table 6). Assuming both constant fertility and constant family formation 
and dissolution rates (Benchmark Scenario), the share of women giving birth to one child 
at most will increase by around 10 percentage points at the expense of the share of 
women with three or more children. 
With an increase in fertility by 0.5 children per woman (Fertility Scenario) the 1985 
population distribution will only change to a small extent: the share of women of parity 
2 will grow at the expense of the share of women of parity 3 +. This shows that the share 
of women of parity 3 + will decline even when an immediate response to the new pension 
policy in terms of an increase in fertility is assumed. 
5. COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
From around 338 billion Austrian Schillings in 1985, total social security expenditure 
would steadily increase until 2030 up to around 372 billion Austrian Schillings assuming 
constant fertility and mortality rates (Benchmark Scenario (BM), see Table 7). In this 
period, total population size already declines significantly, thus social security 
contributions would decline from around 303 billion Austrian Schillings in 1985 and 2000 
to around 231 billion Austrian Schillings in 2030. The decline in total population size is 
also reflected in a decline in family benefits (minus 42%) and to a smaller extent a 
decline in health expenditure (minus 9%) and unemployment benefits (minus 18%). 
Although total population size decreases, the number of pensioners increases and pension 
expenditure would increase by around 30%. The share of pension expenditures among 
total social security expenditure would thus increase from around 60% in 1985 to more 
than 70% in 2030. The resulting balance between social security contributions and 
benefits, the ratio contributions/expenditures, would decline from 0.89 in 1985 to 0.62 in 
2030 assuming constant contribution rates. 
Table 7. Social security expenditures and contributions, 1985-2050 (in billion Austrian 
Schillings). 
Year 
1985 
2000 
20 15 
2030 
2050 
Social security 
contributions 
BM 
Ratio 
contributions/ 
expenditures 
Old age and 
survivor 
pensions 
Fer BM BM 
Other social 
security 
expenditures 
303 303 
303 302 
283 297 
23 1 274 
181 276 
Fer Fer BM 
0.89 0.89 
0.87 0.85 
0.78 0.79 
0.62 0.68 
0.60 0.77 
204 204 
219 219 
239 239 
265 265 
218 225 
Fer 
134 134 
130 138 
122 139 
108 137 
87 132 
Comparatively, it is not before 2015 that the assumed increase in fertility by 0.5 
children per woman would have its impact on the performance of the Austrian social 
security system (Fertility Scenario (Fer), see Table 7). In the short run additional 
children would increase family benefits and thus total social security benefits, 
deteriorating the ratio contributions/expenditure. In the long run, however, the assumed 
increase in fertility would result in a stable size of the labor force, while according to 
benchmark assumptions the labor force would start to decline rapidly. As a consequence, 
the ratio contributions/expenditure would swing back up to 0.77 in 2050. 
Figures in Table 7 are based on the current Austrian pension (and social security) 
system. Below, costs and benefits of a pension policy considering children born are tested 
from the point of view of the social security system on the one hand and of individual 
retiring women on the other hand. 
5.1. Social Security System Perspective 
It is assumed that the new pension system will be matured in 2030. In the year 2000 
the old system still applies for each retiring woman, while in 2015 roughly half of the 
retired female population will receive benefits according to the new rules. As a 
consequence, in the year 2000 pension benefits do not differ from those calculated for 
Table 7. 
Old age pension benefits provided for women will increase even with the current 
Austrian pension system and constant 1985 demographic settings, by 37% until the year 
2030 (see Table 8, item a) -- due to an increase in the retired population and due to an 
increase in average old age benefits per beneficiary by around 20%. The latter increase 
is a consequence of the observed increase in female activity levels during the last two 
decades. Under the new system, i.e. 5 additional years of insurance per child, old age 
benefits would rise by an other 27%. Assumptions on fertility levels have no impact on 
pensions expenditures before around 2045. 
Total pensions expenditures for women (see Table 8, item b) have a different effect. 
In the long run, the pension policy introduced could even reduce the expected increase 
in total pension expenditures somewhat, in 2030 by 6%. The increase in old age benefits 
is more than made up for by the decrease in survivor benefits. Calculations for the new 
system are based on a gradual cancellation of survivor pensions. In 2030, when the 
system has reached maturity, total pension benefits equal old age pension benefits. 
Whether the existence of a survivor's pension, which has been a social necessity, can 
be challenged in the future is difficult to judge. This issue is connected with the question 
of the role and status of women in the future society. Calculations for this study are 
based on the assumption that the following decades will bring the desirable development 
to end the discrimination of women in all respects, including their economical, political 
and personal situation. In view of this assumption, a cancellation of survivor regulations 
together with an implementation of an emancipatory policy is both sensible and desirable. 
The total amount of benefits hardly changes, but the distribution of benefits among the 
female population changes significantly. With the current system, childless married (and 
at a later date widowed) women benefit at the expense of single or divorced women with 
children. The more children a woman has the more she is discriminated by the pension 
system. 
Table 8. Old age and total pension benefits of women in million Austrian Schillings; 
current versus new pension system. 
a. Old age pension benefits 
System Scenario 1985 2000 2015 2030 2050 
Current system: Benchmark 61796 66444 73723 84875 72468 
New system: Benchmark 61796 66444 86214 108017 89836 
Fertility 61796 66444 86223 108022 95281 
b. Total (= old age plus survivor) pension benefits 
System Scenario 1985 2000 2015 2030 2050 
Current system: Benchmark 94274 96024 103176 115381 97917 
New system: Benchmark 94274 96024 105849 108017 89836 
Fertility 94274 96024 105858 108022 95281 
While an increase in fertility as a consequence of the introduction of a pension 
system considering children born has virtually no impact on total pension expenditures - 
- at least not before the end of our projection period -- it immediately influences other 
social security expenditures. Table 9 gives social security costs by major program 
(excluding pension expenditures) both for Benchmark and Fertility Scenario assumptions. 
Since the calculation for social security costs is based on "social security age-profiles", 
changes in time and differences between scenarios are entirely due to changes in the age 
structure of the population. While current low fertility (Benchmark Scenario) reduces 
family benefits by 42% until 2030, fertility around replacement level (Fertility Scenario) 
keeps family and maternity benefits almost at the 1985 level (see Table 9). The assumed 
increase in fertility gives a 40% increase in family benefits until 2015, a 70% increase 
until 2030 and a 120% increase until 2050, compared to constant fertility. 
Since health expenditures significantly increase with age, and work-related benefits 
mainly apply to people at working ages, these types of expenditures are less sensitive to 
both the expected change in the population's age structure and assumptions concerning 
fertility. With constant fertility, the decline until 2030 is only 9% for health expenditures 
and 18% for work-related benefits, which consist of unemployment benefits and work 
injury costs. On the other hand, an increase in fertility results in an increase in health 
expenditures by 5% and almost constant work-related benefits until the year 2030. 
Compared to constant fertility this corresponds to a 15% increase in both types of social 
security expenditures in the year 2030. 
Table 9. Social security costs by major program, 1985-2050 (in million Austrian 
Schillings). 
Apart from higher social security costs the assumed increase in fertility results in an 
increase in the labor force and thus in social security contributions. The female labor 
force will slightly decline in the short run, since the increase in fertility gives a different 
distribution of women across parity and thus reduces overall labor force participation 
rates (see Table 10). In the long run, however, additional children will move into the 
labor force, which will then increase by 5%, 19% and 52% until 2015, 2030 and 2050, 
respectively, compared to the Benchmark Scenario. 
Scenario Expenditures 
Benchmark Health expenditures 
Family benefits 
Work-related benefits 
Fertility Health expenditures 
Family benefits 
Work-related benefits 
Table 10. Additional labor force due to the assumed increase in fertility, in 1000 people 
and in percentages of total labor force. 
1985 2000 2015 2030 2050 
72862 73590 71978 66638 539 14 
37829 32519 26567 21939 16949 
23813 23827 23229 19467 15623 
72862 75636 76932 76374 72821 
37829 38497 37136 37545 36995 
23813 2384 1 24475 2246 1 22667 
Having collected both costs of and contributions to the social security system, it is 
possible to elaborate on the performance of this system in dependence on the political 
and demographic assumptions. From around 36 billion Austrian Schillings the Austrian 
social security deficit will increase almost exponentially to 142 billion Austrian Schillings 
in 2030 if the current system and current fertility are assumed to continue (see Table 11). 
In percentages of contributions the deficit amounts to 62% in 2030 and 68% in 2050. 
Sex 
Women 
Men 
Both sexes 
Women 
Men 
Both sexes 
2000 2015 2030 2050 
-33 64 19 1 4 13 
0 95 286 638 
-33 159 477 105 1 
-2% +5% + 18% + 50% 
0% +5% + 19% + 53% 
-1% +5% + 19% + 52% 
The deterioration is most dramatic in the period 2015-2030, when the aging process 
reaches its maximum. If the new pension system is adopted, the deficit would be slightly 
lower than with the current system even under constant fertility assumptions -- although 
the difference is barely significant. A possible response to the new system in the form 
of an increase in fertility, however, could substantially improve the performance of the 
system. The growth of the deficit accelerates in the following decades, but it is more 
limited during the periods of strongest aging. In percentages of contributions, the deficit 
amounts to only 44% in 2030 and 26% in 2050. The ratio contributions/expenditures will 
again improve after 2030, thus in 2050 being back to the level of 2015. 
At this point it seems interesting to show how a pension scheme considering children 
born that still provides full survivor benefits would perform. Assuming fertility increases 
by 0.5 children per woman, the deficit with such a system would be significantly higher 
than with the current pension system given no increase in fertility. After around 2035, 
however, the increase in fertility starts playing a positive role, keeping the deficit 
increasingly lower than with the current system and current fertility. This demonstrates 
that in the long run any scenario would be better than continued low fertility. 
Table 11. Estimated social security deficit, 1985-2050. 
It is interesting to look at the distribution of social security costs by major programs. 
While under constant fertility assumptions the share of pension expenditures would 
increase at the expense of other programs, especially family benefits, shares of the major 
programs would almost remain unchanged if fertility reaches a level around two children 
per woman. 
Year 
1985 
2000 
20 15 
2030 
2050 
Still, some other measures like, for example, increasing the mean age at retirement 
would be necessary to prevent the social security system from a partial breakdown. The 
main conclusion from the point of view of the social security system is that the 
implementation of a pension policy of the kind suggested in this paper will 
Deficit in 
billion 
ATS 
BM Fer 
Deficit in 
percent of 
contributions 
-36 -3 6 
-45 -55 
-78 -83 
-142 -120 
-123 -73 
BM Fer 
Ratio 
contributions/ 
expenditures 
12% 12% 
15% 18% 
27% 28% 
62% 44% 
68% 26% 
BM 
Proportion of 
pension benefits 
among ss-costs 
Fer BM 
0.89 0.89 
0.87 0.85 
0.78 0.78 
0.62 0.70 
0.60 0.79 
Fer 
60% 60% 
63 % 61% 
66% 64% 
71% 65% 
71% 62% 
-- by no means deteriorate the performance of the social security system; 
-- possibly improve the performance of the system if a certain response in the form of 
an increase in fertility occurs; 
-- put an end to some of the discussions currently going on in Austria. Among those 
is the conflict concerning the lower legal age at retirement for women, which is 60 
years in contrast to 65 years for men, that blocks any change in the system since the 
Austrian Constitutional Court declared this law unconstitutional. The only decision 
made by the government so far (January 1992) was to suspend this Court's decision 
by one year. The ongoing discussion concerning the role of the survivor's pension, 
its relevance in the light of the strong changes in people's living arrangements, the 
question whether it should be extended to divorced spouses as well, could all be 
swept aside. Replacing survivor benefits by additional old age benefits of course 
requires a certain attitude towards women's rights and an adequate policy to achieve 
equality. It would almost be of no consequence if certain survivor benefit 
regulations, possibly in a different form, would be kept for the few women who are 
not entitled to their own old age pension. 
5.2. Individual Perspective 
From the point of view of a retiring woman quite different questions arise. What 
pension benefits will a mother of three children on average receive compared to a 
childless mother? How much money could this mother already have saved during her life 
if she had decided not to have children? What should a pension policy look like to, at 
least, compensate a mother's lower income during the period of retirement? 
With the current system, average old age pension benefits differ strongly by a 
woman's family status. This is not surprising since benefits are directly proportional to 
the number of years worked, or rather years of insurance, which depend on family status 
as shown in Table 2. The main aim of a pension scheme considering children born would 
be to achieve a kind of equation for childrearing efforts, at least during the period of 
retirement. 
Table 12 opposes status-specific average old age pension benefits women would 
receive on the basis of the current pension system and the new pension system. The 
table gives average benefits by family status in percentages of the overall average for the 
year 2030, since this is the year when the new system would be mature. With the current 
pension system, single and divorced women are better off since they on average have less 
children than married and widowed women. Old age pensions significantly decline with 
parity, the average of a childless mother being 60% higher than the average of a mother 
of three or more children. With the new system implemented, differences by parity are 
no longer significant and so are differences by marital status. 
In the case of the current pension system, the uneven distribution of pension 
benefits across family status is even more pronounced when survivor pensions are 
included and hence total pension benefits are compared. Differences by marital status 
are changed to the opposite. Widowed women receive by far the highest amount of total 
benefits, while divorced and single women are discriminated. Married women usually still 
live with their spouse and can expect to become widowed some time in the future. 
Pension differentials by parity are not influenced to a significant degree when sunivor 
benefits are added, but there is a small reduction in the expected differences. 
Table 12. Average old age pension benefits in 2030 by family status (average = 100). 
Marital status 
(average = 100) 
How much money would a retired mother receive because of her children under the 
new pension system? Yearly gains in old age benefits by parity are given in Table 13. 
Figures again relate to the year 2030 when the new pension system would have reached 
maturity. Since 5, 10 and 15 additional years of insurance are granted to women with 1, 
2 and 3 children, respectively, the increase in additional old age benefits with parity is 
approximately linear. Yearly benefit gains amount to around 11,100,25,000 and 36,600 
Austrian Schillings or, expressed in percentages of the average old age pension in 2030, 
12.3%, 27.7% and 40.5% for parities 1, 2 and 3, respectively. 
Parity 
(average = 100) 
System 
Current system 
New system 
Table 13 also shows average losses of savings by parity and depending on the real 
interest rate. As discussed in Section 3.2, savings losses consist of losses due to direct 
childrearing costs and losses due to lower economic activity caused by the existence of 
children. For both parts, losses are calculated assuming a 10% savings rate and 
alternative real interest rates of O%, 1.5% and 3%. The two components of savings 
losses -- childrearing costs and loss of income due to lower economic activity -- are 
responsible for around 50% of total savings losses each. Savings losses have been 
calculated on a lifetime basis and have then been distributed over years of retirement to 
make gains and losses comparable. 
Given a real interest rate of 0%, savings losses -- distributed over 23 years of 
retirement -- amount to around 9,700, 13,800 and 15,700 Austrian Schillings (see Table 
13) for parities 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Savings losses do not increase linearly with the 
real interest rate, since compound interests give an exponential increase. Hence, savings 
losses for a mother of two children equal 23,000 Austrian Schillings with a 1.5%, and 
even 38,000 Austrian Schillings with a 3% interest rate. Losses do not increase linearly 
by parity either, as a consequence of the shape of parity-specific childrearing costs and 
economic activity levels. The ratio of savings losses by parity is -- assuming a 0% interest 
rate -- 1.0 (for parity 1) : 1.42 (for parity 2) : 1.62 (for parity 3), which roughly averages 
the ratio of parity-specific childrearing costs (1.0 : 1.25 : 1.53, respectively, see Table 4) 
and the ratio of losses in economic activity (1.0 : 1.65 : 1.73, respectively, see Table 2). 
sin mar wid div 
121 95 95 113 
99 98 100 108 
0 1 2 3+ 
130 111 88 81 
102 99 97 104 
Table 13. Yearly gains and losses by parity due to the new pension policy in the year 
2030 (in Austrian Schillings). 
2 children 1 25028 13810 1 11219 12.4% I1 
Real 
interest Parity 
rate 
0 %  1 child 
3 children 1 36573 15693 1 20880 23.1% 11 
Gain Loss 
in of 
benefits savings 
1 1 103 9702 
2 children 25028 2035 
3 children 1 36573 22994 5673 1 10900 12.1 % 
Absolute Difference 
difference in % of 
gain-loss av. pension 
1401 1.6% 
1.5 % 1 child 
Comparing pension benefit gains and savings losses, it turns out that from the point 
of view of the individual woman no consistent conclusion can be drawn. Whether the 
new pension policy implemented could actually force women to have additional children 
is difficult to say, since the conclusions heavily depend on the economic assumptions 
adopted. What actually was looked at in those calculations is the following: are 
additional pension benefits provided by the new system sufficient to make having children 
more rational than using a certain amount of the additional income, in our calculations 
lo%, to realize a private savings-type pension in addition to the state pension scheme. 
In this case "additional income" refers to the difference in salary between parity 0 and 
parities 1 to 3. The lower the assumed real interest rate, the lower the capital 
accumulated by a savings-type pension scheme. When viewed by a mother of two 
children (see Table 13), the policy is effective in the case of a 0% and a 1.5% interest 
rate (yearly gains of 11,200 and 2,000 Austrian Schillings, respectively), but a 3% interest 
rate clearly gives preference to the savings-type option (yearly losses of 13,000 Austrian 
Schillings). The real interest rate necessary to balance losses and gains is in the case of 
a mother of two children at around 1.8%. Any real interest rate below 1.8% makes the 
pension policy reasonable. However, viewed by a mother of only one child or of even 
three children the balance real interest rates are 0.5% and 2.6%, respectively. For a 
mother of three children the policy is rational up to a real interest rate of 2.6%. In the 
case of a 0% interest rate benefit gains (savings losses deducted) would almost reach one- 
fourth of the average old age pension. For a mother of one child, however, only a low 
level of economic performance makes the pension policy reasonable. A 3% interest rate 
induces savings losses (already including benefit gains) of almost one-fifth of the average 
old age pension. 
11103 16439 
3 % 1 child 
2 children 
3 children 
-5336 -5.9% 
1 1 103 27577 
25028 37988 
36573 41768 
-16474 -18.2% 
-12960 -14.3% 
-5 195 -5.8% 
Even if no general conclusion independent of assumptions on economic variables 
can be drawn, the above results indicate the following: 
-- The rationality of the pension policy increases with parity. One-child families are 
supported the least, three children families the most. The emancipatory goal of the 
new pension policy is fulfilled. 
-- From the point of view of a childless mother the incentive to give birth to a child 
is only modest since one child is not sufficient to exhaust the policy's possibilities. 
To decide to have more than one child before having any child is a difficult if not 
impossible precondition. 
-- From the point of view of a mother of one child the incentive to give birth to a 
second child is strong. A woman with one child is already discriminated against 
childless women (in terms of lifetime income including pensions); a second child 
would significantly increase the income available during the period of retirement. 
-- From the point of view of a mother of two children the incentive to give birth to a 
third child is even stronger. Again, a third child would significantly increase the 
income available during the period of retirement, while -- on average -- economic 
activity and thus income during active life changes only limited when moving from 
parity 2 to parity 3. 
-- It may be possible to achieve the pronatalist goal of the new pension policy. Since 
one main reason for the low fertility level in Austria is the large number of children 
without siblings, and since women of parity 1 are encouraged to have additional 
children, the policy could be effective. Assuming a "rational" fertility behavior, a 
decrease in the proportion of one child families and an increase in the proportion 
of families with two or more children should be expected. The proportion of 
childless women should probably increase further. 
It is important to look at the sensitivity concerning assumptions on other variables. 
The savings rate was assumed to equal 10% of the gross salary. A balance of pension 
benefit gains and savings losses is easily achieved by changing assumptions on the 
respective savings rate. The lower the assumed savings rate, the better the suggested 
pension policy performs in comparison with a private savings-type pension scheme. In 
the case of a 1.5% real interest rate the savings rates necessary to adjust savings losses 
to parity-specific gains in benefits are 7%, 11% and 14% for parities 1, 2 and 3, 
respectively (see Table 14). The higher the interest rate, the lower the required savings 
rate. Given a 3% real interest rate, from the point of view of a mother with only one 
child only an unrealistic savings rate below 4% makes the pension policy rational. On 
the other hand, for a mother of three children and given a 0% real interest rate, even a 
high savings rate of 22% would give pension benefits that are lower than those provided 
by the new pension system. 
A good indication of a proper specification for a pension policy considering children 
born can be obtained by calculating the additional number of years of insurance such a 
policy should offer to balance benefit gains and savings losses, based on assumptions 
concerning both the savings rate and the real interest rate. The savings rate is again 
assumed to be lo%, and -- to be consistent with other conclusions -- real interest rates 
of 0%, 1.5% and 3% are compared. On the basis of a 1.5% real interest rate, the policy 
should at least provide 7.5, 9 and 10 additional years of insurance for women of parities 
1, 2 and 3, respectively, to legitimately be called "pronatalist" from the point of view of 
any mother (see Table 14). A pension scheme can still be called pronatalist, of course, 
if only women of parities 2 and over benefit, as would be the case with the provisions of 
the pension policy tested (given a 1.5% real interest rate). Again, the higher the interest 
rate the more difficult it is to implement a policy that makes having children rational. 
A real interest rate of 3% would give the private savings-type pension scheme preference 
over having children and taking advantage of the pronatalist changes in the pension 
system, independent of a woman's parity. 
Table 14. Sensitivity analysis of the new pension policy, by real interest rate. 
Table 14 confirms the conclusion that the adopted pension policy supports women 
of parity 3 the most and of parity 1 the least, which can again be interpreted as an 
achievement of the emancipatory goal of the policy. If one would decide to set up a 
pronatalist, but not emancipatory policy that supports mothers equally, irrespective of the 
number of children born, different changes would have to be implemented. The increase 
in the number of years provided should not be linear, as is the case in the adopted policy 
which provides 5, 10 and 15 years, for parities 1, 2 and 3, respectively, but rather 
logarithmic. 
Balances 
by number 
of children 
Parity 1 
Parity 2 
Parity 3 + 
6. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
By incorporating results of a family model in a policy simulation tool that combines 
a pension model with social security age-profiles, it was possible to arrive at several 
conclusions concerning the future of the Austrian pension system. The new pension . '  
policy consists of a provision of five additional years of insurance per child born (up to 
three children) for a woman claiming old age pension benefits. At the same time those 
increased old age benefits should replace survivor benefits. Assuming a smooth transition 
period for the implementation of the new pension system, the system would reach 
maturity in 2030. The first conclusion is that, independent of demographic developments, 
the new system would not increase total pension benefits. Secondly, it would significantly 
change the income distribution of retired women to the extent that married and widowed 
Balance private savings rate 
(in % of the gross salary) 
for real interest rates of: 
0% 1.5% 3% 
11 7 4 
18 11 7 
23 14 9 
Balance number of years 
provided by the policy 
for real interest rates of: 
0% 1.5% 3% 
4 7.5 13 
5 9 17 
6 10 17.5 
childless women no longer benefit at the expense of single and divorced women with 
many children. Thus, the emancipatory goal of the policy is fulfilled. Thirdly, provided 
a certain response to the new system in the form of an increase in fertility, the 
performance of the social security system would improve. Discussions that currently 
prevent the Austrian pension system from being changed at all should seriously consider 
the options tested. 
In the long run, fertility at around replacement level significantly facilitates the 
maintenance of a social security system of the pay-as-you-go type. To a certain extent 
the p o l i j  implemented could be called pronatalist since mothers could benefit from the 
new system, depending on the economic variables (savings rates, real rates of interest). 
On the other hand, for a childless mother the incentive to give birth to a child is only 
modest. Assuming a strong potential for response to the policy, more two- and three- 
children families should be expected, while the proportion of one-child families should 
decline. The proportion of childless women, however, should probably increase further. 
Given the large number of one-child families in Austria, overall fertility should be 
expected to increase. 
Some general questions arise when talking about the implementation of a pronatalist 
policy. In light of the recent decline in fertility to a level far below replacement level, 
which for the time being marks the end of a steady long-term fertility decline over the 
last centuries, a pronatalist approach does not seem useful at all. Fertility changes and 
parallel changes in living arrangements were mainly caused by the changing status of 
women in modem society. In earlier times, for most women, purpose and 
accomplishment were defined largely in terms of motherhood. Education has motivated 
women to pursue activities outside the family, and at the same time equipped them with 
the skills to do so. Higher education brought about higher economic activity and thus 
economic independence of women. Work has encouraged women to limit their family 
size by providing them with sources of satisfaction and security outside the family. 
Women are no more naturally inclined to limit themselves to motherhood than men are 
inclined to limit themselves to fatherhood. Strong changes in women's rights and 
possibilities have occurred although women still are discriminated. 
Returning to earlier motivations of childbearing is certainly impossible. Any 
pronatalist policy must provide conditions that encourage people, not women alone, to 
have larger families. Issues like providing individual child care facilities to an adequate 
degree, or especially encouraging men to share childrearing efforts with their partner 
have to be addressed. Thus, using a one-sex model is a simplification not only from a 
modeling point of view, but also with respect to the contents: both women and men have 
to be covered in a pronatalist policy in a modem European society. A pronatalist policy 
should aim at a new form of familism that enables both parents to make their individual 
freedom and independence and their family ambitions compatible. But even then it is 
not certain whether policies actually can influence individual behavior. 
As a consequence, the main purpose of the pension policy suggested in this paper 
is emancipatory: it contributes to a society that guarantees a fair treatment of everybody. 
Neither shall women be discriminated against men, nor shall mothers be discriminated 
against childless women. The latter aim is easy to address in an emancipatory pension 
policy; the former needs additional changes in both policy and society. 
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